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H4l1thic UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 17 Cr. 47 (DC) V. 5 MAHMOUD THIAM, Defendant. Final Pretrial 6 Conference 7 -----x 8 New York, N.Y. 9 April 21, 2017 9:36 a.m. 10 11 Before: 12 HON. DENISE COTE, 13 District Judge 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 JOON H. KIM Acting United States Attorney for the 16 Southern District of New York 17 BY: ELISHA J. KOBRE CHRISTOPHER J. DiMASE 18 Assistant United States Attorney U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 19 BY: LORINDA I. LARYEA 20 LAW OFFICE OF AARON GOLDSMITH, PC 21 Attorneys for Defendant BY: AARON M. GOLDSMITH, ESQ. 22 ALSO PRESENT: KATHERINE BOSLEY, Paralegal Specialist, DOJ 23 PATRICK KILLEEN, Special Agent, FBI 24 25

1 (Case called)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Is the government ready to proceed?

MR. KOBRE: Yes. Good morning, your Honor. Elisha
Kobre Lorinda Laryea, and Christopher DiMase for the
government. With us at counsel table is Special Agent Patrick
Killeen of the FBI and Katherine Bosley, paralegal specialist
with the Department of Justice.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: For the defendant Thiam, are you ready to proceed?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Ready, your Honor. Aaron Goldsmith on behalf of Mr. Thiam, who's present in court this morning.

THE COURT: Welcome, everyone.

This is our final pretrial conference. I understood that the defendant might be delayed because of arrival from the facility, but thankfully that did not happen, so we're able to proceed pretty much on time.

As I said, this is our final pretrial conference before Monday's trial, and I've just received defendant's motion to take testimony by videoconference. That's an April 20th submission that came in sometime last night, I guess. And similarly, an April 20th submission from the government that came in I guess sometime last night. And we'll get to those.

Let's march through the other issues that are on our schedule for this final pretrial conference, and those include

rulings on the motions in limine that were made by the government.

Let me begin with just some housekeeping issues before I get to the motions in limine. I know the charging instrument here, the indictment, seeks forfeiture. Are counsel expecting that to be submitted to the jury, or will that be an issue for the Court, depending on the jury's resolution of guilt on the two counts?

MR. KOBRE: Your Honor, from the government's perspective, it will be an issue for the Court at sentencing.

THE COURT: And Mr. Goldsmith, do you agree?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes, that was my expectation.

THE COURT: Thank you so much.

Let's talk about the schedule. We begin Monday.

We'll start at 9:30 in the morning, hopefully get a venire
sometime after 10, and do jury selection, opening statements,
testimony, and sit until 5:00. Each day thereafter, we'll
begin at 9:00 with counsel and the defendant, giving us about a
half an hour to resolve any outstanding evidentiary or legal
issues. Testimony will begin promptly at 9:30, and again,
we'll go until 5:00. We'll take a lunch break each day from
roughly 12:45 to 2, midmorning and midafternoon recess at a
time that's not disruptive and hopefully meets everyone's needs
and desires.

So you are required to have all your witnesses

available and prepared so we sit a full trial day. If you don't, you're deemed to have rested and we move on to the next phase of the case. For the government, that would be moving on to the defense case; for the defendant, that would be moving on to any rebuttal case or summations.

So in order to help us meet this schedule, I want to advise you as well that generally there are no sidebars.

You're expected to discuss with each other well in advance of the issue arising any evidentiary disputes that might, if they are not resolved, require argument, oral argument to the Court, and that's why we meet about a half an hour before testimony begins, and I'm happy to stay at the end of the day, if that's necessary, too.

So I know you've made motions in limine, and I've gotten these letters from you last night which are very much in the spirit of trying to frontload any legal issues that need discussion with the Court, and I appreciate that.

What is the government's current estimate of the length of the trial?

MR. KOBRE: Your Honor, the government expects that it will get its case in within the first three to four days, so we believe that by Wednesday or Thursday -- it's hard to say exactly which -- the government will have completed its witnesses.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to tell the jury that

this case is expected to take a little over a week and tell them that it's our present expectation that it would take no longer than two weeks. I think that gives us the flexibility we need. Mr. Kobre, does that sound about right to you?

MR. KOBRE: It does, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Goldsmith, does that sound about right to you?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Sounds about right.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Last time we were together, I know the parties were going to try to work on resolving any issues regarding translations. I know you resolved that with respect to the government's expert on Guinean law, and I've relied on that expert's statement of Guinean law provided to me in the government's submissions to craft a jury charge on the contents of Guinean law. Are there any other disputes on translations that we need to address?

MR. KOBRE: Your Honor, could I just have one moment, please.

Your Honor, the government received a number of translations and produced them to the defense just last night. I've had conversations with defense counsel. We don't anticipate that there will be any disputes over those, and we will attempt to resolve any of them, but we don't believe this is a case in which something turns on a subtlety in the

translation such that these matters would be disputed, and I believe, in my conversations with defense counsel, that that's agreed upon.

THE COURT: Mr. Goldsmith?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes, I think that we would continue in the spirit that we have been, which is generally trying to work it out amongst ourselves. We'll flag something for the Court if there's a dispute. As Mr. Kobre just said, we got a bunch last night that my people have to look at. But I don't anticipate there will be any contest about the translation, but if one does come up, we'll certainly flag it for the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you so much. I appreciate that attitude and cooperation by all counsel in this case, and so I'm going to expect that if there are any disputes on translation about documents that either the government or the defendant seeks to offer in its case in chief, that those disputes will be brought to my attention at our Monday 9:30 conference.

MR. KOBRE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Let's turn to the motions.

Oh, I guess some other just housekeeping issues. I don't have counsel stand for the jury when they enter or leave the courtroom, and you don't need to ask the Court's permission to approach a witness to show them a document. Just identify

the document on the record as you are walking to the witness and leave the document with them and then return to your station to question the witness on the document. Good. So the record will just be clear that you're showing the witness Defense Exhibit C or Government Exhibit 4, and then you can return and continue with your questioning.

Let's turn to the government's motions in limine.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Your Honor, I'm sorry to interrupt --

THE COURT: Mr. Goldsmith.

MR. GOLDSMITH: —— but I wanted to bring up, obviously the Court had addressed scheduling and the Court had also addressed my letter from yesterday, which I notified the Court that my written invitation to certain foreign witnesses was based upon the government's earlier estimations of its case, that at least one witness may not be available until next week. The Court responded that defense witnesses should be prepared for Thursday, based upon the government's current estimation, and I just wanted to note an exception for the record. These are extraordinary circumstances for these witnesses coming from very far lands and they did have specific requirements for my request to have them come over by visa, which presented problems which is not typical for our court to have to address. So I just wanted to note that for the record.

THE COURT: First of all, there aren't exceptions in federal court. If you have an objection, make an objection,

and I'll give you an opportunity to be heard.

I don't understand the basis for any objection with respect to my endorsement, but I'm going to give you an opportunity to be heard when we address your second submission of April $20^{\rm th}$ about the motion to take testimony by videoconference. Why don't we address all those issues together.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Very good.

THE COURT: Thank you.

So turning to the motions in limine, the government made six separate motions in limine. There is consent on four of them and certain disagreements or opposition with respect to two of them. So I'm going to list those on which I understand there is consent. And they are: the motion to instruct the jury on Guinean antibribery law, as indicated in the government's motion in limine; the motion to admit foreign business records from Hong Kong pursuant to Section 3505; the motion to admit records from two banks, HSBC and JPMorgan Chase, as business records pursuant to 803(6); and lastly, the motion to preclude defense from making arguments or presenting evidence concerning the statute of limitations. So those motions then are granted on consent.

We have two motions that I'm prepared to discuss with counsel and rule on, but I want to make sure that you had a chance to add anything that you'd like to your written

submissions.

The first motion that there is disagreement on is the motion to preclude defense counsel from offering certain evidence and testimony regarding a document called the shareholders agreement, and the defense, as I understand it, wants to offer evidence at trial on the impact and beneficial effect of the mining contract that was issued to a Chinese entity on behalf of Republic of Guinea, and I think it brings us to an interesting legal issue about the jury charge and whether or not a motive to accept a bribe because one has an internal belief that it will ultimately benefit your country is relevant or a defense, and so that's one level, and I'm prepared to give you some legal guidance with respect to what I understand the law to be on that issue.

There is a second issue, and that is, I don't precisely know what documents or testimony is implicated by the defense's opposition. I can imagine, theoretically, a situation which, if the defendant took the stand, there would be broader scope for his testimony before the jury about what was in his mind and what motivated him. So I think what I'd like to do is put that aside for the moment and give you guidance, give you an opportunity to be heard and then guidance, reserving the right to address these issues anew, if necessary, if the defendant decides to take the stand at trial.

And let me ask Mr. Goldsmith, just in terms of the

procedure, would that be helpful to just separate out the 1 conversation for the moment as it might implicate the 2 3 defendant's choice to take the stand? 4 MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Good. 6 MR. DiMASE: Your Honor? 7 THE COURT: Yes. MR. DiMASE: In terms of addressing the issue, I do 8 9 think it makes sense to at least discuss the difference between 10 the defendant's subjective mind-set at the time of the 11 agreement and other evidence. I think there is a separation 12 there, and there might be some agreement between the parties 13 about what might be appropriate were the defendant to testify. 14 THE COURT: So, Mr. DiMase, you are agreeing with the approach I'm taking --15 16 MR. DiMASE: Your Honor --17 THE COURT: -- to separate out --18 MR. DiMASE: To separate it out. THE COURT: -- the discussion of the defendant's 19 20 testimony and the scope of that testimony from what we're now 21 going to discuss. 22 MR. DiMASE: I think that's fine, your Honor. I would 23 like to add something about our view, if the defendant 24 testifies as well, but we can certainly separate them out.

So reserving, again, the

THE COURT: Okay. Good.

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issue of what the scope of proper testimony might be if it comes from the defendant on the stand, putting that aside, does anyone wish to be heard with respect to this issue, the government's second motion in limine as it applies to other evidence?

MR. DiMASE: Briefly, your Honor, but would you like to hear from the government first or from Mr. Goldsmith first?

THE COURT: I don't think you put in a reply, which I didn't invite reply, so that's not a criticism, but I just think the ball is in your court, because you've heard now from Mr. Goldsmith, so you get a chance to respond, and then of course I'll give him a chance to be heard.

MR. DiMASE: Very good, your Honor. First, I just want to make clear, the shareholders agreement, as the Court is probably now aware from the submissions, is the ultimate agreement that was negotiated between Guinea and the Chinese conglomerate. There were a series of other agreements leading up to it, the memorandum of understanding, and then two, quote-unquote, master agreements, and so I think to be clear, what we're discussing is not just the shareholder agreement, it's sort of all of the agreements together and their benefit, or not, to the country of Guinea. So just to make clear what we're discussing.

Your Honor, I don't want to belabor the points that we already made in our motion in limine. I do think there is a

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difference between the subjective belief of the defendant at the time of the agreement and his negotiation, which we'll get to in a moment, and the defense counsel's, I would imagine, interest in cross-examining government witnesses and putting on his own witnesses to say one of two things: one, that they subjectively believe that this agreement, and the series of agreements, benefited Guinea or was in the best interest of Guinea, particularly in hindsight, questioning them about whether, looking back, this agreement was the right decision for Guinea to make. It's very clear under the case law, and under the law of Guinea, as explained by Mr. Togba, that it doesn't matter whether or not the decision or the acts that the official took was fair or not. I think that has a direct corollary in US law to Section 201, the federal bribery statute, which there's a lot of case law on the meaning of, on this issue in particular, whether something is fair or not, right or not, and the courts have made clear it doesn't matter whether the act that the person took was something they would have taken otherwise absent a bribe, whether it was an exercise of appropriate discretion within their job description, or not. The criminalization or the underlying policy issue that we're trying to deal with here is substituting the judgment of an unaffected public official, an unbiased public official, with one who has received money to do something. That is really the core of the statute, and I think it applies with equal force to

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Guinean antibribery laws. So it isn't about whether, subjectively looking back, this agreement was good or bad for Guinea. I want to be clear. I do think that the witnesses that testify for the government will articulate their views at the time of the agreement when the negotiations were taking place about what benefits they foresaw coming from the agreement, and in fact there will be testimony about Mr. Thiam himself articulating to many other ministers the benefits of this agreement, because he's promoting the agreement. It is the government's theory that he's doing that, at least in part, because of the bribe money he received. So it would be natural to expect him to promote, articulate the benefits of the agreement to other ministers in an effort to get that agreement executed by the Guinean government. But what I think is problematic is questions about the subjective belief of the government witnesses, and any defense witnesses that might be called, about whether the agreement was in fact good for Guinea, whether the result of the agreement benefited Guinea, and also actual evidence of the fruits of the agreement. does not appear to be relevant under the law as described in Mr. Togba's affidavit and the corollary in US law under Section 201 whether, for example, a train was built after the agreement by the Chinese conglomerate. There are some things like that, actions that the Chinese company took following the entry into the agreement, including a train being built,

I think there were also some water treatment projects that were worked on by the Chinese company. I don't think it would be a problem for witnesses or the defendant to testify about their belief about what would happen when they were negotiating the agreement, but as far as what did happen afterwards, it just doesn't appear to be relevant under the standard, both in Guinean law and in US law.

THE COURT: So this is very helpful to me because I am hearing a distinction being made that I think we should focus on with care.

MR. DiMASE: I agree.

THE COURT: There is one thing about conversations, a witness taking the stand and saying, assuming it's admissible testimony, X said Y. To me, there is a separate issue about whether the witness should be asked about their own belief at the time about benefits to Guinea. And then there appears to be a third issue about what actually did happen afterwards and a fourth issue about a person's judgment in retrospect after the fact. Now as I understand it, the government is taking the position that issues three and four, what happened after the fact, and someone's current assessment of the benefits or lack of benefits is irrelevant. Am I understanding that correctly?

MR. DiMASE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: But with respect to the first two issues,

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the government is taking the position that both are admissible — both the statements of who said what to whom with respect to benefits but also the witness' belief at the time about the benefits. Is that relevant?

MR. DiMASE: Give me one moment, your Honor.

Your Honor, I think, with respect to the second category of evidence that you described, I think it would be admissible testimony to the extent that it explains why they decided to do what they did, i.e., in other words, why the witness decided to enter into the agreement or sign the agreement, and I think that has more to do with their understanding of what the benefits would be under the agreement rather than a broad subjective view about whether it would be good for Guinea or not. And it's a very fine distinction and maybe a distinction without a difference. But I think the key point is, the witnesses are going to testify about their view of the benefits of these agreements at the time they signed into them to explain why they were willing to enter into the agreement, and it's in part based on statements made by Mr. Thiam and other people regarding the anticipated benefits to the agreement. So that testimony is going to be elicited.

THE COURT: That's very helpful. Very helpful, Mr. DiMase.

So Mr. Goldsmith, you have heard from the government that it will not object to evidence with respect to

conversations at the time of these events, the unfolding of these events, regarding benefits, who said what to whom with respect to perceived benefits that would inure to the Republic of Guinea from entering into what we're calling the umbrella shareholders agreement. You've also heard that they will not object to examination, during direct or cross-examination, of witnesses with respect to their state of mind, at the time these documents were executed or were being considered, about the benefits. But their objection is solely, as I understand it, to what actually unfolded after, for Guinea, its experience after the shareholders agreement was executed, what benefits the country did or didn't derive from them; and secondly, what a witness' current or subsequent evaluation was of the benefit or lack of benefit from the shareholders agreement to Guinea. So we have a lot of agreement now, I think, and I need to understand whether there is disagreement with respect to the latter two categories.

Mr. Goldsmith.

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MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes. I thank the government for clarifying its position this morning because, as the Court mentioned, I think that does go to some of what my opposition had argued. In terms of, I guess we call it hearsay, I think largely that comes in for state of mind for what those witnesses were experiencing at the time; certainly what their beliefs and understandings were as part of the negotiations.

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And I do agree that that's appropriate here in court. So the latter two aspects, I would agree that an opinion in retrospect is not appropriate here. However, I do still disagree on the aspect of the actual events or the actual impact of the agreement, for one reason and one reason only. And more I quess basic than I put in my papers, the jurors in this case have heard three or four years of report after report of public corruption cases where there is a stigma of deals being made to individuals in the public, on behalf of public officials, that are undeserved or that are obtuse or obese, and if the jury is given what we thought, that this is going to benefit Guinea, we thought that this was going to work out and we were told that this was going to work out, but we leave off the denouement of what actually happened as a result of the agreement, then we open up the opportunity for the jurors to make speculative inferences that somehow these are all empty lies, somehow the Chinese conglomerate came in and didn't fulfill any of its promises or gave very basic concessions to the country and therefore bolsters the idea in their mind that a truly corrupt deal was made without the benefit of actual evidence there to support it. So that is my concern.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

So let me give you my ruling and the basis for it, and this is to guide your preparation for trial and the examinations you conduct at trial, but if the trial, as it

unfolds, gives you a belief that you should have a good ground for revisiting these issues, feel free to discuss that with each other. If you reach agreement, great; if you don't, feel free to raise it with me again.

So let's start with a description of what I think the controlling legal principles are. They're set forth, in the first instance, in Rules 401, 402, and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Relevant evidence is evidence that has a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. And evidence that is not relevant is inadmissible. And of course, even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the categories of concern listed in Rule 403.

Articles 192 and 194 of the Guinean Penal Code, like United States bribery law, require only that the defendant solicit or receive a thing of value in return for engaging in an act or refraining from engaging in an act. Under Guinean law it is irrelevant whether the act in question was "fair... or not."

United States bribery law is entirely consistent with that approach. It "makes it a crime for a public official... directly or indirectly, corruptly to demand, seek, receive, accept, or agree to receive or accept, anything of value in

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return for being influenced in the performance of an official act," as the Supreme Court so recently described in the *McDonnell* case, 136 S. Ct. 2365. "[A] public official is not required to actually make a decision or take an action on a question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy; it is enough that the official agreed to do so. *Ibid*, 2370-71.

Under United States law, that the result of the bribed official's action actually benefits the electorate does not "insulate" a defendant from criminal liability. United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d at 113. Even if the receipt or tender of a bribe was partially motivated by a valid purpose, the participation in the act of bribery is criminal. explained in United States v. Biaggi, "[a] valid purpose that partially motivates a transaction does not insulate participants in an unlawful transaction from criminal liability." 909 F.2d at 683. See also City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 378, in which the Supreme Court noted that a mayor in that case would be "quilty of accepting a bribe even if he would or should have taken, in the public interest, the same action for which the bribe was paid." United States v. Orenuga, 430 F.3d at 1165-66; and United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d at 1169 n. 13.

So I think the legal principles that apply here are stable, well established under both Guinean law and American law. They're entirely consistent with each other, and they

give us the guidance that we need.

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So it is entirely irrelevant what the Chinese did or didn't do with respect to the shareholders agreement in terms of fulfilling any commitments that they made or giving any benefits to the Republic of Guinea. If the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a bribe was paid under Guinean law, it may take that information and apply it to the two crimes charged in the indictment and see whether the government's remaining requirements of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under those two statutes are met. It would in fact be I think highly prejudicial here to introduce into this trial and try whether or not the Guinean people actually did benefit from anything the Chinese did or didn't do after the agreement was It would confuse the issues; it would mislead the entered. jury with respect to the legal standard; it is irrelevant. therefore, based on the record before me now, and of course without prejudice to counsel revisiting these issues if, as the trial unfolds, they believe there is a basis to revisit them, there will be no evidence received as to what the Chinese did or didn't do following the execution of the shareholders agreement that did or didn't benefit Guinea. And there won't be testimony with respect to any witness' views after the fact as to whether or not actions that the Chinese took after the alleged bribe payment did or didn't benefit Guinea. course, again, I return to the first issue. This is all

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without reservation to revisiting these arguments if the defendant takes the stand. Very different standards may apply in that context, and I will want to hear from both sides before I give you guidance with respect to what the defendant may testify to, should he take the stand.

So I think that gives you the ruling on the government's second motion in limine.

Let's turn to the last motion in limine that I believe the parties have not agreed upon, and that is the fourth motion in limine in which the government identified statements -these were in Exhibit D to its motion papers -- the statements that it sought to offer as admissions by the defendant. come from the FBI interview on the day of the defendant's arrest and after he had been administered Miranda warnings. And I've read all of the government's proposed sections that it seeks to admit. There is no argument, as I understand it, that any of those sections aren't admissible. The question is whether the remainder of the interview should come in or not, and very helpfully defense counsel, besides making that general argument, also presented a letter to me outlining the specific passages that the defendant believed were most worthy of admission under the rule of completeness. And let me just make sure I have that document at hand.

So in the defendant's letter of April 16 -- this was a two-page submission -- the defendant identified passages,

beginning at page 46 and ending at page 185 to 186, that he believed should be offered under the rule of completeness.

I'm prepared to rule on this. I've gone through each of these passages, but I want to make sure that if anybody wanted to add anything to their submissions — you know what, why don't I do this. Why don't I give you my ruling and then, once you have that, give you an opportunity to be heard, okay? So we're going to flip it.

First of all, let me give you the law as it applies to this issue.

Of course a defendant's prior statement is admissible under Rule 901(c), 801(d)(2), both as not hearsay because it's a statement by a party opponent, and that's true even if it's a false statement. They are not offered for the truth, of course. And these principles are well established in the law.

I'll just read some Second Circuit citations. United States v. Russo, 302 F.3d at 43; United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d at 84.

And as the law recognizes, the defendant may not seek to introduce his own prior statement for the truth of the matter asserted. It's hearsay and inadmissible. United States v. Kadir, 718 F.3d at 124.

There is an exception to all of these principles, though, and that's set forth in Rule 106, and that's the rule of completeness. So if a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the

introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement that, in fairness, ought to be considered at the same time. And as the Second Circuit explained in *United States v. Johnson*, 507 F.3d 796, application of this principle requires the Court to weigh several factors. Under this principle, even though a statement may be hearsay, an omitted portion of a statement must be placed in evidence if necessary to explain the admitted portion, to place the admitted portion in context, to avoid misleading the jury, or to ensure fair and impartial understanding of the admitted portion. The completeness doctrine does not, however, require the admission of portions of the statement that are neither explanatory of, nor relevant to, the admitted passages.

And with that, let me rule first that the entire statement is not coming into evidence, under the rule of completeness. And so let me turn my examination to the individual passages.

There are three that the defendant has requested that I'm going to grant or grant in part. The others are denied. So let me turn to the three that I'm going to grant.

Let's turn to page 57. I'm referring to the Bates numbers at the bottom of Exhibit D. And on page 57, the defendant requests admission of the following: the entirety of the passage beginning at -- and these are time stamped, I

think -- 20 minutes and 28 seconds on page 57, running to page 58, 21 minutes and 48 seconds. I'm denying that request except for the following. At the top of page 22, the government seeks to offer the following statement: "And the president gave us instructions to proceed and try to (inaudible) with him." They offer nothing else with respect to the highlighted portion -- that is, highlighted by the defendant. I'm going to allow the defendant to have received before the jury at that same time the following phrase: "If he wanted to bring money to the country." So it's the clause that immediately follows the portion that the government seeks to offer.

The next is page 64. And I'm going to allow or grant the defendant's request to admit the paragraph on page 64 that begins at minute 28, 15 seconds, and begins with the phrase:

"Then there was another reason for four trips," down to the end of that page, where he was just saying "Okay."

And then turning to page 185, the defendant seeks admission of the remainder of page 185 and the first three lines on the top of 186, and I grant that request as well.

So let's start with the government. Do you want to reargue any of the three passages I've ruled are admissible?

MR. KOBRE: May I just have one moment, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's move on. Let's move on. I'll take a brief recess later in the conference and then we'll return to

this, and I'll give both the government and Mr. Goldsmith a chance to revisit these rulings, but you can assume those are my rulings unless you wish to revisit them.

The government's just handed up a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's Rule 15 motion. Mr. DiMase, has this been filed on ECF?

MR. DiMASE: Your Honor, we finished preparing it just before the conference so we haven't had a chance to file it.

We will file it today.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you.

Okay. So let's turn to the issues raised through the submissions of April 20th. And again, I just saw these before I took the bench so I haven't had a chance to fully incorporate these into my analysis of the legal issues that might arise at the trial, but let's do our best and see if we can make some progress.

Let's start with the government's April 20th motion, or letter. It has to do with two separate issues: whether certain documents that they list, beginning with the memorandum of understanding and ending with an executive power transfer document, whether they should be received under Rule 803(8). And Mr. Goldsmith, have you had a chance to reflect on that issue?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes, your Honor. We discussed this informally with the government yesterday and reviewed their

letter last night. We have no objection.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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And the second is concerning four agreements, and I think this isn't necessary for us to go into because I think it's then covered by the prior agreement of the parties pursuant to Rule 803(8), but the government had made a separate argument with respect to four of the documents in that longer list and why they are admissible not as hearsay, but they're coming in under the parties' agreement so that's taken care of.

Then I have the two submissions from defense counsel of April 20th, the one that I said we'd return to -- that is, the letter in which I understood the defendant to be asking me for a precise date that could be entered in the visa application as the date any defense witnesses must be present to testify in this courtroom. I gave the precise date of April 27th, which is next Thursday, so that defense witnesses, if they were available to testify next Thursday, would be heard. And then the motion made later in the day yesterday, or at least I didn't receive it until this morning, to take one witness' testimony by videoconference. And that witness is Momo Sakho. He's described as an expert on Guinean law and an expert on the Guinean mining industry. Now I understand from this submission that there is no dispute about principles of Guinean law and so I understand from this submission that the principal reason for his testimony is not

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to testify or present evidence to me about Guinean law, because that's an issue of law for me, but instead to testify as an expert on the Guinean mining industry. Do I understand that correctly?

MR. GOLDSMITH: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. And did you make an expert disclosure for him?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes. I provided the curriculum vitae to the government, I explained what we expect his testimony to be, in more general terms, and I have provided, I think by means of this motion, the arguments which I think support the materiality of his testimony. We've discussed this particular witness on several occasions amongst the parties, and as I included in the motion, really the only issue we have is materiality. So as I explained in the motion to the Court, this is an individual who's worked in the mining sector, is familiar with the mining sector, worked as a legal adviser to the minister of mines for the Republic of Guinea, and worked as an adviser to the president of the Republic of Guinea during the relevant time and is going to be able to synthesize for the jury the mining industry, the procedures that were in place, and how they were procedures, protocols in Guinea at the time when Mr. Thiam was acting as the minister.

THE COURT: Procedures for what?

MR. GOLDSMITH: For applying for the exploration

rights, applying for the ultimate drilling rights, the benefits -- I'm sorry, not the benefits, but the process that was required for the mining, for the prospective mining companies in order to obtain those rights, as it goes hand in hand with the shareholder agreements and the other agreements that are subject to this case.

THE COURT: I don't have a written expert disclosure.

Did you --

MR. GOLDSMITH: No, I did not provide a written disclosure to that detail.

THE COURT: Okay. So why don't I take then, in as much detail as you're able to give me, the expert disclosure.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Sure. Through his experience working in the mining industry, he will discuss the necessary steps that a mining company has to go through in order to receive the exploration rights, who has the ability to give those exploration rights, and how --

THE COURT: Hold on one minute.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Sure.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLDSMITH: -- and how those exploration rights are granted. He will also be able to describe, from the perspective of the government of Guinea at the time, the government's protocols and procedures as to how a mining company would have applied for exploration rights.

THE COURT: How is that different from what you've just said, the necessary steps? Are these the necessary steps from the government's point of view?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Actually, for this particular witness, both, because he's able to give the perspectives, both from a private industry perspective as well as from his role as the legal adviser of the minister of mines in 2009.

THE COURT: So when you say then the necessary steps for a mining company to get exploration rights, you're saying from the perspective of the mining company and from the perspective of the government.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Correct.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. GOLDSMITH: He can also discuss within his role, as the legal adviser, if there were any procedures that were suspended or changed as a result of the current regime status during that year.

THE COURT: And what procedures were those?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Essentially, as the Court will learn more, is that a number of the procedures in place were suspended temporarily during the relevant time by presidential decree. As the Court is already aware, there was a military regime in power at the time. It was seeking to influence a lot of cash into a very cash-strapped nation. And as a result, that developed into a circumstance where the president was in

some instances calling the shots with his legal adviser, with the advice, to a lesser degree, of the ministers in the cabinet. He can describe that process.

THE COURT: And you're seeking to offer this all as expert testimony.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Correct.

THE COURT: And when did you make this disclosure to the government?

MR. GOLDSMITH: We've been discussing the nature of the witness for a couple of weeks. Not only --

THE COURT: Can you give me a date?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Probably around April 10th or 11th. I have not gone into all of this detail with them because we've had some question mark as to whether he was even going to be able to get here to be able to testify, which falls in line with the videoconference. If the Court may or may not be aware, his visa was rejected pursuant to my request for him to come over for the purposes of trial. The justice department, through the U.S. Attorney's Office here, made a number of — from my understanding, made a number of attempts to see what, if any, influence they may have in trying to secure his travels, and they were informed that they had no authority or ability to influence that in any way. He has reapplied for his visa, but I have not heard from him in the last three or four days as to whether or not that has been

granted. So that is really the only reason that's obviated the need for the request.

THE COURT: So have you told him that he must be here on April $27^{\mbox{th}}$?

MR. GOLDSMITH: I have not. I initially, as of a couple weeks ago, had put in my letter of invitation for the week of May 2nd through 4th, which was in keeping with the government's earlier estimates as to how long it was going to take them to get through their case in chief.

THE COURT: I didn't ever hear those estimates. I heard an estimate of a two-week trial. So let's backtrack so I can get some background here. When did you make the request for this witness to come here to testify?

MR. GOLDSMITH: I believe the first request was on April $7^{\mbox{th}}$ or $8^{\mbox{th}}$.

THE COURT: And then you notified the government on $$\operatorname{April}\ 10^{\mbox{th}}$$ or $11^{\mbox{th}}.$

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yeah, it was the following week.

THE COURT: And when you say you made a request for him to come May $2^{\rm nd}$ or $3^{\rm rd}$, what were you relying on in making that?

MR. GOLDSMITH: The government's estimate of a two-week trial. So in that thinking, knowing that the Court would not sit on a Friday, unless juries were deliberating, I assumed it would take a week for the government to get through

its case in chief and then to have him as a prospective defense witness come the following week.

THE COURT: Okay. So you did not ask the government when it expected to rest.

MR. GOLDSMITH: No. Not at that time. It was only through our most recent conversations, and by that I mean the last couple of days, that the government has informed me that they expect to complete their case in chief roughly on Thursday, which was the cause of the letter that I sent to the Court last night.

THE COURT: Okay. And this letter that you sent refers to witnesses attempting to travel to the United States, and as I read the letter, you needed for them to have precise dates to include in their visa applications, and I tried to respond as quickly as I could, the very same day, giving you that information, which would be next Thursday, the 27^{th} .

MR. GOLDSMITH: Right.

THE COURT: Now what witnesses are you referring to in the April $20^{\mbox{th}}$ letter besides Mr. Sakho?

MR. GOLDSMITH: There is also an individual named Mohammed Aly Thiam, same spelling as the defendant although not related, who also is a lawyer in Guinea and worked as an adviser to the government at the time.

THE COURT: And when did you first request him to come?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Actually, my understanding as of yesterday is that his visa application was approved.

THE COURT: So he'll be here on Thursday.

MR. GOLDSMITH: He will be here I believe the following Monday, on the $1^{\mbox{st}}.$

THE COURT: Okay. He has to be here this Thursday, counsel.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}\xspace$. GOLDSMITH: I will do whatever I can to make that happen.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

So if the government rests Wednesday or Thursday, for me to put this trial over until Monday morning at 9:30 for a defense witness, I'm going to need a record of extraordinary due diligence.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Very well.

THE COURT: And I will need every witness, including the defendant, who plans to testify and is available to testify Wednesday or Thursday to take the stand so that holding the jury over until Monday morning to hear additional testimony does not unnecessarily delay the trial.

So before I turn to the government, Mr. Goldsmith, is there anything else you wanted to say to me about Mr. Sakho and why his testimony should be taken by video teleconference?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Well, as to the why, as I included in my papers, I think his testimony is important for the jurors to

understand, because this is a fairly novel and precise industry that most people are not familiar with, that being the mining industry and how organizations are able to get the rights to go forward with a mine.

And in terms of the necessity for the videoconference, in this particular case, he's in a position where he's in a foreign country and he has, at least thus far, been denied the opportunity to travel to the United States, and as I put in my submission, the government agrees that he satisfies every other prong of Rule 15(c) except, obviously, that they are contesting the materiality aspect.

THE COURT: And when did you give notice to the government that you wished to take this deposition?

MR. GOLDSMITH: We have been collaboratively speaking over the last couple of weeks about whether he was getting the visa on a reapplication, whether there was anything that the justice department could do to help, and it was after the point where it sort of became apparent to all of us as a group that (A) justice couldn't do anything to help; and (B) I was unsure as to what his status was in reapplying. So it was the last week that we discussed whether or not he satisfied the elements of Rule 15, and to those ends, we were having those conversations, and ultimately yesterday -- I'm sorry. I had informed the government earlier this week that I was intending on filing a Rule 15 motion. I wanted to get it done on

Wednesday but was unable to so I had to file yesterday.

THE COURT: So you gave notice to the government on, what was it, Monday or Tuesday?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Well, notice as to the circumstances has been ongoing for the last couple of weeks.

THE COURT: Right. But notice that you decided to take the deposition?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Was I'd say probably Monday.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's the 17th.

So just to put this in context, on April 7th, you requested the witness' presence for trial; on April 10th or 11th, you gave notice to the government that you had an expert witness on the mining industry that you wished to call; on April 17th, you gave notice to the government of a desire to take the witness' deposition for use at trial in the event the visa was not granted.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes, your Honor. Those are roughly the dates. I'm not sure if it's a day or two off, if the government has a different or better recollection, but those are the rough timelines.

THE COURT: And you have not provided a written disclosure of expert testimony but you have today given an oral description which you believe to be its equivalent on the record.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes, your Honor. That's a copy of the

initial disclosure that I provided the government on April 6th, which has Mr. Sakho's curriculum vitae, original and translated form, which I had very briefly discussed those two aspects.

MR. GOLDSMITH: I will file it on ECF. If the Court recalls, you had placed an order so that we could not discuss this particular witness or a couple of other potential witnesses' identities because I feared some retaliation by the local government. That's sort of a mooted point at this point as Mr. Sakho has been denied his opportunity to travel to the United States seemingly through ends that are much different than ours. So I will file this retroactively.

THE COURT: Thank you so much.

Okay. So I haven't read the government's opposition to the Rule 15 motion. Just give me one second to briefly glance at it.

Okay. So I've briefly glanced at the government's opposition. I don't understand that the defendant is now seeking to offer character evidence through Mr. Sakho. Am I correct, Mr. Goldsmith?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Correct.

THE COURT: Good. So it's just the expert testimony

we need to concern ourselves with.

The government indicates that you haven't made a showing of this being material in the sense of being relevant and exculpatory. Do you want to add anything before I hear from the government?

MR. GOLDSMITH: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So who's going to speak on behalf of the government, if anyone?

MS. LARYEA: Thank you, your Honor.

I'd like to begin, your Honor, with the expert disclosure. We handed you the letter from Mr. Goldsmith dated April $16^{{
m th}}$ that essentially --

THE COURT: April?

MS. LARYEA: April 6th -- I'm sorry -- that stated that Mr. Sakho would testify regarding Guinea bribery laws in effect during the relevant time period as well as the state of the Guinean government while defendant Thiam held public office and roles/responsibilities to the minister of mines.

As the Court knows, Rule 16 requires the defendant to give the government a written summary of any testimony that defendant intends to use under Rule 72, 73, or 75, and that summary must describe the witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for those opinions, and the witness' qualifications. This letter on April 6th is inadequate and does not meet that standard. Today is the first time the government has heard

this level of detail about the subject of Mr. Sakho's testimony. And moreover, during recent conversations with defense counsel, the government was under the understanding that since Mr. Sakho no longer will be testifying about the Guinea bribery laws, the additional testimony that was being proffered was being proffered as lay testimony and no longer as expert testimony. So that was the government's understanding with respect to Mr. Sakho's testimony.

MR. GOLDSMITH: I'll clarify, your Honor. That is correct. That is a correct representation, that I informed them last week that in light of our agreement as to the Guinean bribery laws in effect, that he will not be used as an expert on the aspects of laws, and therefore, it would be more of a lay witness perspective from his roles.

THE COURT: Well, this is a completely different, then, analysis. Obviously if this is lay testimony, then you don't need to make an expert disclosure. So that's one thing. But if it's lay testimony, it would be coming in as someone who participated in the underlying events in a way that would be relevant and meaningful to the jury, and I don't hear that. I didn't hear that at all. I heard a description orally from defense counsel today about this person being called as an expert, and setting aside a whole set of issues with respect to whether that expert testimony was timely disclosed and appropriate and not reaching those issues, now hearing that

it's offered as lay testimony, I don't understand how it's admissible at all.

So Mr. Goldsmith, let me return to you. As lay testimony, how is this admissible? Was this witness, Mr. Sakho -- please be seated, counsel. Was this witness involved in these transactions? And if so, does he seek to offer testimony about what he did in a way that is relevant to the execution of the shareholders agreement or the constellation of documents we're talking about?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes, your Honor. He was a legal adviser to the minister of mines at the time, as well as the adviser to the president at the time, so he can testify as to what happened during the approval process for the exploration rights and the negotiations and approval of the shareholder agreement.

THE COURT: Okay. So this is a completely different description of relevance than was made to me just a few minutes ago.

Okay. So I think there is a lack of meeting of the minds here. When we take our break, we'll give you all a chance to reflect on this and I'll come back and give you guidance. If he's a lay witness, that's one thing; if he's an expert witness, it's another. I just have to know which rules of evidence and principles of law I'd be applying here. And to the extent that there is a contention that any of this is

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exculpatory to the defendant, which I haven't heard that any of it is, I want to make sure I hear that as well.

Good. So I think before we move on to remaining issues, I just want to clarify the schedule again. government rests, whatever day that is -- and they have indicated Wednesday or Thursday -- the defendant must put on its case, if it has a case. And if it chooses not to put on a case, that is just fine, but if it chooses to put on a case, it must have its witnesses available in the court and ready to proceed. The only exception that might be made at this point to the defendant being deemed to rest without calling a particular witness is potentially Mohammed Aly Thiam, whose visa has been approved. Yesterday I gave counsel notice that a defense witness had to be available on Thursday. Apparently that information has not yet been communicated to Mr. Thiam, so I'll require his presence on Thursday or deem the defendant to have rested unless I have a showing of due diligence with respect to getting him here on Thursday, and the latest I would receive defense testimony from him would be Monday morning at 9:30, assuming that the defendant had otherwise rested on Wednesday or Thursday.

Okay. So let's turn to other issues.

Let's talk about the status of plea discussions. And I'm required by the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit jurisprudence to inquire with respect to the status of plea

discussions, make sure that the defendant is well aware of any plea offers that have been extended, and that defense counsel has shared those with the defendant. So I want to give you, Mr. Thiam, an opportunity to hear about those now on the record, and so it's important that you listen carefully to me as I address questions to counsel, both the government and your own attorney. Do you understand that, Mr. Thiam?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And by the way, Mr. Goldsmith, I would very much like to pronounce your client's name correctly. Could you give me instruction on that score.

MR. GOLDSMITH: "Tee-om."

THE COURT: "Tee-om." Thank you very much.

So let me ask the government, did the government extend a plea offer to the defendant?

MR. KOBRE: Your Honor, the government did not extend any formal plea offers to the defendant. There were informal plea discussions, and I can describe those for your Honor if you'd like.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KOBRE: So what was first discussed between the parties was the defense counsel's request that the defendant be permitted to plead guilty, not to either of the counts in the indictment but to some different or lesser charge. And the government rejected that out of right. The government insisted

that the defendant plead guilty to at least one of the counts in the indictment. The government explained to defense counsel that we believe that the guidelines calculation that will apply at sentencing — and I can run through that for your Honor, but essentially what it boiled down to, your Honor, was a guidelines range of 97 to 121 months if the defendant is convicted on both counts at trial. Would your Honor like me to walk through the guidelines calculation that leads to that?

THE COURT: No.

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MR. KOBRE: Okay. Your Honor, in conversations with defense counsel, I asked if defense counsel had a proposal that the government would consider, something short of that. And defense counsel did come back with a proposal, and the proposal was a plea to Count One. That's the 1957 count. I'm sorry. I apologize, your Honor. A plea to Count Two, which is the 1956 count, and a guidelines calculation resulting in an offense level of 19 and, given the defendant's criminal history category of I, a guidelines range of 30 to 37 months. That was the defense counsel's proposal. And the reason that the quidelines range is substantially lower is because, under the defense counsel's proposal, the amount of the laundered funds would be a lesser amount, because Count Two applies to a discrete transaction, a portion of the bribery proceeds. conveyed to defense counsel that if defendant was actually willing to really consider such an offer, we would discuss it

internally and we would get back to him, but we weren't going to make such an offer unless the defendant was really prepared to accept such an offer, and I conveyed that to Mr. Goldsmith. And Mr. Goldsmith came back and said that the defendant would not be interested in such an offer.

So that's where the plea discussions sort of left off is that the defendant was not seriously interested in considering the proposal, the best proposal, I would say, that defense counsel was able to come back with.

THE COURT: And Mr. Goldsmith, does that recitation accord with your recollection?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And did you discuss these issues with your client?

MR. GOLDSMITH: I discussed the Sentencing Guidelines as well as my proposal based upon Count Two. I did.

THE COURT: Thank you. And I don't want to hear the details of the discussions with your client, but have you discussed your evaluation of the strength of the evidence against him?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes, I have.

THE COURT: And again, I don't want to hear the substance of your conversations with him, but have you conveyed to him your own recommendation of what he consider doing with respect to a plea or with proceeding to trial?

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               MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Thank you. So Mr. Thiam, please stand.
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               Please place the defendant under oath.
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               (Defendant sworn)
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               THE COURT: Now, Mr. Thiam, have you taken any drugs
      or medicine or pills in the last 24 hours?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Except for my prescription medication,
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      no.
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               THE COURT: And what is that prescription medication
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      for?
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               THE DEFENDANT: For diabetes, high blood pressure, and
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      high cholesterol.
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               THE COURT: And does that medication affect in any way
      your ability to understand what's happening in this proceeding?
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               THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
               THE COURT: Does it affect in any way your ability to
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      communicate with your attorney?
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               THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Is your mind clear today?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Do you understand what's happening in this
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     proceeding?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Now did you hear the questions I
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      placed to the government and its responses to me with respect
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to the plea negotiations?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And did you hear the questions I placed to your attorney and his responses to me concerning those plea negotiations?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And was your attorney's account of his discussions with you, to the extent that he disclosed them here on the record, accurate?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. You may be seated.

Before we take our break, I know you have a couple open issues to discuss. Let me just turn to the voir dire, and then I think I'm done with my list of things to cover with you.

So the defendant requests, in his proposed voir dire questions, inquiry as to whether or not an individual member of the venire was born outside of the United States, and also there are a series of questions, but I think that gets to the heart of it. There is another question about whether or not the juror or the juror's parents immigrated to the United States from a West African country. And is there any objection by the government to me inquiring of the potential jurors regarding that?

MR. KOBRE: Just one moment, very briefly, your Honor.

No objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Good.

So let's take our break. When we come back, I'll hear any other issues that you want to discuss with respect to this final pretrial conference. I'll hear you if you have any desire to raise -- again, either the government or the defendant -- on my rulings on the completeness issue with respect to the defendant's statement, and then we'll hopefully complete our discussion about Mr. Sakho's testimony. I now understand it's being offered as lay testimony, which has its own requirements of relevance and materiality. And I am particularly interested now in understanding what role this person played that he is competent to testify about and how that would be relevant, in the first instance; and secondly, exculpatory to the defendant in the second instance.

Okay. Good. Thank you. Let Ms. Rojas know when you're ready to proceed.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.

(Recess)

(In open court)

THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel, I understand you're ready to resume.

And I understand that, Mr. Kobre, you asked my deputy to inquire whether I had any objection to you posing questions to witnesses while seated. Absolutely not. The record should reflect Mr. Kobre is in a wheelchair, and no one would expect

you to do anything other than sit comfortably wherever you'd like. And because of the size of the podium, I think you can place questions, unless there is an objection from Mr. Goldsmith, from the government's counsel table.

Mr. Goldsmith, is that agreeable to you?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Of course.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. KOBRE: Thank you very much, Judge.

THE COURT: Yes. Okay. So let's go march through our items.

Let's first clean up, if there is anything to clean up, with respect to the defendant's statement on the day of his arrest. Did you, Mr. Goldsmith, wish to revisit any of my rulings in that regard?

MR. GOLDSMITH: What I would prefer to do, if agreeable to the Court, is reserve my right to renew my objections to the Court's decision denying the excerpts that I've proposed at such time as the government seeks to introduce the portions of the transcript which it's introducing, dependent upon what the context is at the time. So in other words, as the government seeks to introduce the portions of the transcript, I would like the opportunity to object to the Court's denial of my request, if I deem in the context it would require, under the circumstances, the requested portions from defense be added.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me just inquire. Mr. Kobre, is the government planning to play this as a videotape to the jury?

MR. KOBRE: It is, your Honor.

THE COURT: And so you need rulings today in order to create one seemless videotape presentation for the jury?

MR. KOBRE: Yes, your Honor. Actually what we were planning on doing is creating clips of the video, so that there wouldn't be any technical issues. We can just play the clips that have been ruled upon, agreed upon. And so yes, it would be helpful to have those rulings today.

THE COURT: Okay. So I've given you my rulings. I've given Mr. Goldsmith an opportunity to reargue with respect to any of my rulings. His objections are preserved, as made through the April 16th letter and otherwise in his response to the motions in limine. So there's no need, Mr. Goldsmith, for you to renew any objection. Thank you.

And does the government wish to revisit any of my rulings with respect to admitted portions of the defendant's videotaped statement?

MR. KOBRE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Fine.

Let's move on then to the issue with respect to

Mr. Sakho, whom I now understand is potentially a lay witness,
not an expert witness. I do not understand anything about his

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role in the underlying transactions and what competent evidence he might have to offer, much less how it might be exculpatory to the defendant.

MR. GOLDSMITH: And if I may, after conferring with my team and Mr. Thiam, again, I can clarify that. Mr. Sakho was the previous adviser, I should say he was the adviser to the minister of mines immediately prior to Mr. Thiam. Mr. Thiam was in office, Sakho was the adviser on mining to the president. Mr. Sakho was in attendance at the cabinet meetings regarding the negotiations of the specific deal. He was in a position where he was a member, a ranking member of several committees that oversaw the negotiations of that deal. also obviously engaged in discussions with the president at the time on the presidential level and was privy to meetings with the president and the president's opinion as to those negotiations and the effectuation of the final voting and approval of the CIF deal. My expectation, from reading the 3500 material that's been coming in on a rolling basis, is that a couple of the government's witnesses are going to testify that Mr. Thiam was in a position to promote the CIF deal and to advocate on its behalf, and had perhaps undue influence beyond the role that he has as the minister of mines in order to make that happen, and I think that Mr. Sakho will be in a position to rebut that presumption, or to rebut that testimony.

THE COURT: By saying what?

MR. GOLDSMITH: By testifying that there were transparency, by testifying that the president was the one who was promoting the deal rather than Mr. Thiam.

THE COURT: So if I accept his testimony, when you say rather than Mr. Thiam, is he going to be in a position to testify that Mr. Thiam did not promote the deal?

MR. GOLDSMITH: He would be in a position to testify that while Mr. Thiam appropriately acted as the minister of mines to present the deal and to have some level of negotiations with the deal, that the decision making and that the approval process ultimately rested with the president under the circumstances in addition to the cabinet as a whole, and that the force behind the negotiations came from the presidential office rather than the minister of mines office.

THE COURT: So --

MR. GOLDSMITH: In other words --

THE COURT: The witness was present at meetings and heard conversations that would permit him to testify that the defendant had a role in the negotiation and presentation of the CIF transaction but that he was not the sole person who was in favor of the transaction, nor was he the ultimate decision maker, and that the ultimate decision maker was the president and/or cabinet and that they strongly favored the CIF deal themselves. Do I summarize correctly what you're telling me?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Correct. And if I can synthesize it

further, that Mr. Thiam was taking direction from the president rather than the other way around.

THE COURT: And what makes any of that exculpatory?

MR. GOLDSMITH: It's necessary, under the

circumstances where the jury is going to hear from a couple of

witnesses that Mr. Thiam is promoting the deal beyond his role

as a minister of mines, because that fact in and of itself, and

unanswered, could possibly lead the jurors to create -- or as

circumstantial evidence to create a reasonable inference that

the bribes took place based upon Mr. Thiam's prior actions as

advocating more strongly than he should have been to have the

country of Guinea engage in the deal with CIF.

THE COURT: Okay. So there's no dispute between the defense witness and the government's witnesses that the CIF deal fell within the defendant's responsibilities as minister of mines, to have a role in the negotiations and a view on the project, as I understand it. And I want to make sure I understand this accurately. You believe there will be a disagreement about how much of that negotiation and promotion fell properly within the defendant's role as minister of mines?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes. This is --

THE COURT: Can you give me specifics on that so I understand what the potential disagreement is, which would make this testimony potentially relevant.

MR. GOLDSMITH: This is a case ultimately about

allegations of a bribe, so if there's a bribe there, then somehow Mr. Thiam has to have the authority, and the ability, as is in the Guinean law, to either act or fail to act, so if we have witnesses for the government that are going to describe, as I anticipate they're going to describe, that Mr. Thiam was behaving in a manner and had authority that was beyond the traditional scope of the minister of mines, then Mr. Sakho's testimony that he was in fact getting directions directly from the president would negate the government's assertion through their witnesses that Mr. Thiam had the authority and ability to act or fail to act.

THE COURT: Okay. So actually, I don't think there's anything in the law that requires the bribe to be paid to the ultimate decision maker to be unlawful. So --

MR. GOLDSMITH: I don't necessarily disagree with that, but the individual does have to have some opportunity to, again, either act or fail to act in furtherance of their role.

THE COURT: But there's no dispute that as minister of mines -- in fact I think you told me, if I remember correctly, that the minister of mines had, at the relevant time, in Guinea a role to play with respect to what we're now calling the shareholders agreement.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes, he did have a role, but this isn't just a mining deal; this is a deal that involves several infrastructure components to it. This was something that

Mr. Thiam -- while he had a role, was not something that could have been as controlling as I think the government's witnesses are going to testify about.

THE COURT: So let me ask the government to explain.

Are you calling any witnesses that have knowledge with respect to the role of the minister of mines in Guinea?

MS. LARYEA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Who?

MS. LARYEA: Mr. Camara and Mr. Sande. Mr. Sande was the minister of the economy and finance at the same time as the defendant, and he can speak as to the role of the minister of mines. Mr. Camara was at different stages the chief of staff for the prime minister of Guinea, and he can also speak to the role of the minister of mines.

THE COURT: And how do you spell those names?

MS. LARYEA: Sande, S-A-N-D-E. Camara, C-A-M-A-R-A.

THE COURT: Okay. So I don't understand that there is ultimately going to be any dispute here with respect to the role of the minister of mines with respect to this project.

Have counsel discussed that issue with each other now that we're sort of drilling down to try to understand the relevance? Have you finished those conversations?

MR. GOLDSMITH: We have not had any conversations as to the definition of roles specific to the minister of mines during the relevant time period.

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THE COURT: Okay. So I don't understand the defendant to have yet made a presentation to support a finding of materiality or much less that the witness has exculpatory information, but obviously this is an evolving issue. It was really on the eve of trial. Of course we're having, for what the Southern District normally does, a fast-track trial at defense counsel's request, but on the eve of trial the defendant has invited a witness to come to this country just a little over two weeks before trial. The request was made on April 7th to attend a trial on April 24th. There have been visa issues, and now there's a request, as of last night, to take a deposition that is opposed by the government. I haven't had a chance to investigate thoroughly the legal standards that will apply to this videotaped deposition request. Normally, of course, a request for a video deposition is made long before trial so people have the opportunity to travel abroad to take the deposition if they wish. Or maybe it's not a deposition; maybe it's to take the testimony through video live.

MR. GOLDSMITH: That's a more precise characterization, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Anyway, I haven't had a chance to look at the legal standards with the care I'd like to. But I think our conversations this morning have been very helpful in trying to understand the nature of the request. It's no longer a request

to take expert testimony; it's a request to have a lay witness testify. We're beginning to understand what the offer is with respect to relevance. So hold on just one second. Let me give you my schedule for this afternoon.

Okay. So I'll give you an opportunity this afternoon to discuss these issues in a fine-grain, detailed way so that we can understand precisely what testimony of relevance this witness may or may not have, how it fits in the context of the trial testimony more broadly, and to what extent it's properly understood as exculpatory, and that, of course, in part depends upon what legal standard applies. I don't think there's any dispute about the legal standard -- I'm not hearing any -- with respect to the violation of federal law charged in the indictment.

So I'll see you at 4:00 on that single issue.

Now let's --

MR. GOLDSMITH: Your Honor, I'd like to make a different proposal. Obviously this is a defense witness who is — I think we may have a little bit of time to make a decision on this. What I'd like to do is — he is French speaking and halfway around the world. What I would propose is that I have a conversation with him over the weekend, develop a very detailed written submission to the government and to the Court as to what his testimony would be on the issue so that it can be detailed, and provide that by Monday morning.

THE COURT: I'll let you provide that to the government by Sunday at noon --

MR. GOLDSMITH: Very well.

THE COURT: -- and, if the government is going to make a written submission to me with respect to these issues, by Monday morning at 9, so that we're all in a position to have a meaningful conversation about this Monday at 9:30.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Very well. I'll provide a submission to the Court as well on Sunday.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. LARYEA: Your Honor, one more issue with respect to Momo Sakho. The court ordered the government not to speak with our witnesses or anyone in Guinea about Mr. Sakho. I believe Mr. Goldsmith said that request from the defense is now moot as his visa was denied and he'd already applied and so his request to attend this trial is now public. We want to confirm that we are now allowed to speak with our witnesses and others about Mr. Sakho to gather information about him.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes, your Honor. I did have that conversation with the government recently and would consent to their ability to investigate.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MS. LARYEA: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: So does the government have any additional issues we need to address at this final pretrial conference?

MR. DiMASE: Very briefly, your Honor. 1 2 As the Court is aware, the government submitted a letter on April 18th along with its request to charge in this 3 It addressed the issue of whether or not the two 4 articles, 192 and 194, represent felonies under Guinean law. 5 THE COURT: I have not focused on that letter. I 6 7 don't think I've read it. Hold on. MR. DiMASE: Yes, Judge. 8 THE COURT: Thank you for bringing this to my 9 10 attention. I had not read it yet. 11 Any objection? MR. GOLDSMITH: I've reviewed the letter. There is a 12 13 tier structure under the Guinean laws of punishment that is 14 similar to the tier structure for felonies and misdemeanors. 15 To those ends, I'd requested from my legal expert as to whether 16 he had any different opinion on whether it could be categorized as a felony or not. I have not gotten a response yet. 17 THE COURT: Okay. So Sunday at noon for that as well. 18 Thank you. I'll assume that there is no objection unless I 19 20 receive notice of one Sunday at noon. 21 Okay. Anything else from the government? 22 MR. KOBRE: No, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Mr. Goldsmith, anything else? 24 A very minor housekeeping issue, your MR. GOLDSMITH: 25 I requested through CJA e-voucher to have authorization Honor.

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for daily transcripts. That has not been authorized yet. And
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      the reporter's office did contact me yesterday to follow up.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. I'll try to turn to that
      application today and I will approve it.
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               MR. GOLDSMITH: Thank you.
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               THE COURT: No problem.
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               Thank you, all. So I'm not going to see you at 4, but
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      I'll see you Monday at 9:30. I look forward to next week's
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      trial.
              Thanks so much.
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               THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.
               (Adjourned)
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